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BAOHONG SUN, SCOTT A. NESLIN, and KANNAN SRINIVASAN* 
Logit choice models have been used extensively to study promotion 
response. This article examines whether brand-switching elasticities 
derived from these models are overestimated as a result of rational con- 
sumer adjustment of purchase timing to coincide with promotion sched- 
ules and whether a dynamic structural model can address this bias. Using 
simulated data, the authors first show that if the structural model is cor- 
rect, brand-switching elasticities are overestimated by stand-alone logit 
models. A nested logit model improves the estimates, but not completely. 
Second, the authors estimate the models on real data. The results indi- 
cate that the structural model fits better and produces sensible coefficient 
estimates. The authors then observe the same pattern in switching elas- 
ticities as they do in the simulation. Third, the authors predict sales 
assuming a 50% increase in promotion frequency. The reduced-form 
models predict much higher sales levels than does the dynamic structural 
model. The authors conclude that reduced-form model estimates of 
brand-switching elasticities can be overstated and that a dynamic struc- 
tural model is best for addressing the problem. Reduced-form odels that 
include incidence can partially, though not completely, address the issue. 
The authors discuss the implications for researchers and managers. 
Measuring the Impact of Promotions on 
Brand Switching When Consumers Are 
Forward Looking 
Logit choice models have proved an invaluable tool for 
studying consumer decision processes. The models have 
generated insights into issues such as market segmentation 
(Bucklin, Gupta, and Siddarth 1998; Chintagunta, Jain, and 
Vilcassim 1991; Kamakura and Russell 1989), state depend- 
ence (Guadagni and Little 1983; Keane 1997a, b; Seethara- 
man, Ainslie, and Chintagunta 1999), and competitive 
asymmetries (Allenby and Rossi 1991). A fundamental find- 
ing is that promotions influence consumer choice; that is, 
they cause consumers to switch from Brand A to Brand B. 
Gupta (1988), Chintagunta (1993), Chiang (1995), Bucklin, 
Gupta, and Siddarth (1998), and Bell, Chiang, and Padman- 
abhan (1999) have examined the magnitude of the brand- 
switching effect, at least relative to dynamic effects such as 
stockpiling, and have found that brand switching accounts 
for the majority of the current period promotion effect. 
A related research stream has studied consumers' dynam- 
ically rational decisions about quantity and purchase timing: 
Golabi (1985), Assunq.o and Meyer (1993), Meyer and 
Assunqdo (1990), Helsen and Schmittlein (1992), and 
Krishna (1992, 1994a, b) study how promotion uncertainty 
determines consumers' optimal forward-buying behavior. 
Erdem and Keane (1996) and G6nial and Srinivasan (1996) 
develop stochastic structural dynamic programming models 
to accommodate consumers' forward-looking behavior. 
G6ntil and Srinivasan find that consumers can accelerate or 
decelerate purchases to coincide with a promotion schedule 
as long as they have sufficient inventory. Erdem, Imai, and 
Keane (2003) develop a dynamic structural model in which 
consumers form future price expectations and decide when, 
what, and how much to buy. These articles demonstrate that 
dynamic structural models are important for capturing 
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rational consumer adjustments in purchase timing due to 
expectations of future promotion activity. 
Our research builds on the study of the brand-switching 
effect by (1) demonstrating a potential upward bias in logit- 
estimated switching elasticities and (2) showing that a 
dynamic rational model can significantly alleviate this bias. 
The intuition behind the bias is that the logit choice model 
does not take into account consumers' rational purchase- 
timing adjustments made to take advantage of a deal. The 
bias misidentifies the promotion purchases as brand 
switches and therefore overestimates the switching effect. 
Keane (1997a, p. 311) describes the situation as follows: 
"Suppose after a few years of shopping I realize that my 
favorite supermarket always cuts the price of my favorite 
detergent, say Era, from $4.00 to $3.50 during one week of 
every month. Most other shoppers at the store realize this 
too. So those who like Era adopt a decision rule that says: 
'Only buy Era if the price is $3.50, and then buy enough so 
that my inventory will last at least 7 weeks (the longest pos- 
sible time until the next sale)'.... If one were to estimate a 
MNL [multinomial logit] model for detergent choice in the 
store, the price elasticity of demand for Era would appear 
enormous."' 
The subsequent numerical example is motivated by 
Keane's (1997a) research.1 Consider two consumers: One 
prefers Brand A and one prefers Brand B. In a no-promotion 
environment, their purchases might be as follows: 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Consumer 1 A A A A 
Consumer 2 B B B B 
Now consider that Brand A is promoted in Weeks 2 and 6. 
Assume that Consumer 2 does not react to this promotion; 
there is no switching effect. Consumer 1 reacts by acceler- 
ating the second purchase forward from Week 3 to Week 2, 
not purchasing in Week 5 in anticipation of a promotion, and 
purchasing in Week 6 when the promotion occurs: 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Consumer 1 A A A A 
Consumer 2 B B B B 
Note that the promotion has not changed consumers' 
brand choices; it has only changed the timing of Consumer 
l's purchase. However, when a logit model is used, it reads 
data from purchase observations only and associates higher 
probabilities of purchasing Brand A with promotions avail- 
able for Brand A. The model overestimates the brand- 
switching effect because it is designed to "fit" the statistical 
relationship between purchase probabilities and promotion 
availability without recognizing the purchase-time adjust- 
ment of a forward-looking consumer.2 
A nested logit model may partly alleviate the overestima- 
tion problem by calculating brand switching conditional on 
a promotion-driven purchase-timing decision. However, this 
model is a reduced form in that it does not model the process 
of dynamic decision making: It still "fits" the relationship 
between probability of purchasing and promotion availabil- 
ities of Brand A. In general, logit and nested logit choice 
models are too simple to take into account consumers' 
forward-looking behavior. For example, nested logit models 
naturally capture purchase acceleration but do not easily 
capture purchase deceleration. A dynamic structural model 
in which the purchase-timing decision is endogenized is 
designed to model this behavior explicitly. 
In addition to more accurate estimation of brand switch- 
ing as a result of marginal additional promotion, another 
potential advantage of a dynamic rational model is that it 
can avoid overprediction of brand switching when there is a 
shift in promotion policy. Keane (1997a) conjectures that 
the logit model would be especially ineffective if a brand 
were to change its promotion policy, because the model does 
not describe how consumer purchase strategies adapt to the 
new policy. 
The intuition that logit choice models overstate the 
switching effect makes sense but simplifies the problem in 
two ways. First, logit models completely ignore the 
purchase-timing decision and consider promotion solely as 
a brand-switching game. As we mentioned previously, tech- 
niques exist to examine choice and timing decisions jointly 
(Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999; Chiang 1991; Chin- 
tagunta 1993; Gupta 1988). Second, the intuition does not 
explicitly take into account consumer preferences. Modeling 
heterogeneity is an inherent part of any logit model and may 
help alleviate the bias. 
Therefore, we undertake the following steps to demon- 
strate the existence of bias and prescribe a solution for it: 
First, we develop a dynamic structural consumer-decision 
model of incidence and choice. The potential advantage of 
the structural model is more accurate brand-switching elas- 
ticity estimates because it endogenously models the process 
by which rational consumers adjust their timing decisions in 
response to promotion uncertainty. In accordance with 
Keane (1997a), we believe this will be particularly effective 
in evaluating changes in promotion policy. Second, we com- 
pare this model to variations of both stand-alone logit choice 
models and choice/incidence models, taking into account 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences. We conduct the fol- 
lowing analyses: 
*Synthetic data simulation: Assuming that the structural model 
is correct, we generate purchase-timing and choice decisions, 
and we estimate logit, nested logit, and structural models on the 
data. This simulation shows that the logit and nested logit mod- 
els produce upwardly biased estimates of promotion-induced 
brand switching, compared with the true effect as generated by 
the structural model. The logit model results are more upwardly 
biased than those of the nested logit model, suggesting that tak- 
ing into account purchase timing at least partially addresses the 
bias issue. 
*Empirical estimation: We estimate the logit, nested logit, and 
structural models on real data and compare brand-switching 
elasticities across the models. We find that the structural model 
fits the data better, and the elasticity results mirror the synthetic 
data simulation. The logit model elasticities are greater than the 
nested logit elasticities, which in turn are greater than the struc- 
tural model elasticities. 
*Policy simulation: Starting with the real data, we increase the 
promotion frequency for one brand and use our models to pre- 
dict sales with and without the policy change. This is a test of 
]We acknowledge the stimulating comments raised by an anonymous 
reviewer on a different article by one of the authors, which also served to 
motivate this example. 
2Note that promotions can also induce larger purchase quantities, and it 
is not difficult to construct examples that show that this effect can also 
induce an upward bias in brand-switching effects. This therefore may 
accentuate the bias. However, we simplify the analysis by focusing on 
brand choice and purchase incidence. 
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the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976), which states that policy mod- 
els that do not account for adjustments agents make in response 
to a "regime" change produce biased predictions. As we 
expected, we find that the logit and nested logit models predict 
much higher sales for the brand with increased promotion than 
does the structural model; this is because the structural model 
addresses the Lucas critique by modeling how consumers 
change their purchase timing in response to policy change. 
Overall, the results suggest that logit choice models over- 
estimate brand-switching elasticities. Although nested logit 
models partially mitigate the problem, a structural model, 
such as the one we propose, addresses the problem 
comprehensively. 
We proceed as follows: First, we develop the structural 
model. Second, we present our synthetic data simulation, 
our empirical estimation, and our policy simulation. Finally, 
we conclude with a summary and discussion of the implica- 
tions for both researchers and managers. 
MODELING CONSUMER DECISIONS IN A 
STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK 
Dynamic Structural Decision Models 
There is a growing body of literature that establishes that 
consumers are forward looking in their purchase decisions. 
The evidence includes the observation that consumers stock- 
pile product in response to promotions (Blattberg, Eppen, 
and Lieberman 1981; Neslin, Henderson, and Quelch 1985). 
The apparent reason consumers stockpile is that they realize 
the lower price, which is available only temporarily, is worth 
the additional future inventory storage costs. Several articles 
have models that formalize this process (Assunqdo and 
Meyer 1993; Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman 1981; 
Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003; Gbntil and Srinivasan 1996; 
Krishna 1992, 1994a, b; Sun 2003). 
We propose a dynamic structural model for analyzing the 
effect of promotion on brand switching in an uncertain pro- 
motion environment. Our primary theme is that forward- 
looking, rational consumers make it difficult for non- 
dynamic models to measure brand switching. Therefore, the 
key phenomena we incorporate are promotion expectations, 
brand choice and incidence, and dynamic utility maximiza- 
tion. The need to model promotion expectations and brand 
choice is obvious given our purpose. The dynamic rational 
model literature assumes that consumers either maximize 
long-term utility or minimize long-term costs under a 
weekly consumption constraint. We believe that utility max- 
imization, is more appropriate for our needs, because we 
want consumers to have the option of forgoing or accelerat- 
ing consumption. 
Comparing these aspects with those in previous literature, 
Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman (1981) focus on promo- 
tion but assume that the promotion schedule is known; in 
addition, they do not model brand choice, and they assume 
that the consumer minimizes costs subject to a consumption 
constraint. Assunglio and Meyer (1993) maximize consumer 
utility and model promotion expectations but do not model 
brand choice. Krishna (1992, 1994a, b) considers brand 
choice and models promotion expectations but assumes that 
customers minimize costs subject to a consumption con- 
straint, as do Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman. Erdem and 
Keane (1996) maximize utility and examine brand choice 
but consider product attributes, not promotion. Gbntil and 
Srinivasan (1996) consider promotion expectations, but do 
not model brand choice, and consider cost minimization. 
Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) consider brand choice and 
purchase quantity in a dynamic utility maximization frame- 
work. Our model is similar to theirs in that it also draws on 
the general framework of Hanemann (1984) to model utility 
for consumption. However, we tailor our model to investi- 
gate the impact of promotion on brand switching. For exam- 
ple, we treat heterogeneity using a continuous distribution 
rather than the latent class approach adopted by Erdem, 
Imai, and Keane. We also use a simpler promotion expecta- 
tions model that focuses on the promotion schedule of indi- 
vidual brand-sizes. This article differs from that of Sun 
(2003), who endogenizes the consumption decision and 
investigates promotion effect on endogenous consumption. 
Model Specification 
We model the consumer decision process as a dynamic 
programming problem under promotion uncertainty. We 
assume that consumer i = 1 ..., I visits the store on the peri- 
odic (e.g., weekly) basis t = 1 ..., T. On each store visit, the 
consumer decides whether to buy and which brand to buy 
given the observed promotions and expected future promo- 
tions of the j = 1, ..., J brand-sizes. We denote the no- 
purchase choice by j = 0. The objective of consumer i is to 
determine, for each of a series of store-visit occasions, 
whether to purchase the category and if so which brand, so 
as to maximize the sum of discounted expected future util- 
ity, Uit, over the finite planning horizon. 
T 1 




The indicator variable dijt = 1 if consumer i chooses brand j 
at time t, and dijt = 0 otherwise for j = 1, ..., J. Because j = 
0 indexes the category decision, diot = 1 means that con- 
sumer i decides not to buy the product category (i.e., 
"chooses" alternative "0"), and diot = 0 means that consumer 
i decides to buy the product category in week t. The length 
of the finite decision horizon is T, and 0 < 8 < 1 is the dis- 
count factor to reflect that consuming now is preferred to 
consuming later (Erdem and Keane 1996; G6ntil and Srini- 
vasan 1996). We denote the mathematical expectation oper- 
ator as E(.). 
For each week t, we define the consumer's utility function 
over that week's consumption of each brand-size, Cijt, and of 
consumption of a composite of other goods, Zit. Thus, the 
utility is given by 
J 
(2) U +cx1Z, (2) UitI = ijtCijt +cliZit, 
j=lI 
where xli measures the benefit from consuming the com- 
posite of other goods.3 The term Vijt denotes the consump- 
tion benefit associated with consuming brand j. We model 
this as follows: 
(3) = ijt 2ij X3iLastijt. 
3Note that we assume that the composite good is not storable, so we view 
Zit as either purchase or consumption. This is to simplify our model, the 
purpose of which is to explain behavior in the focal category. 
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The utility function is state dependent and stochastic, as 
Hanemann (1984) introduces. The variable Lastijt indicates 
whether consumer i purchased brand j at purchase occasion 
t- 1. The benefit from consumption of brand j depends on 
Lastijt. The coefficients X2ij measure consumer i's intrinsic 
preference for brand j. The parameter X3i captures that con- 
sumers' learning of the quality of a product or their famil- 
iarity with a product can influence their consumption pref- 
erence for a product. This state dependence phenomenon is 
also referred to as purchase-event feedback (Ailawadi, 
Gedenk, and Neslin 1999). 
We normalize the price of the composite goods to be one. 
At each period, consumer i has income yit and incurs costs 
as a result of purchasing brands in the category, consuming 
other goods, managing category inventory, and incurring 
stockouts, in accordance with budget constraint:4 
J i 







(5) Pijt = Priceijt - PromijtDscntijt. 
The variable Pijt is the net price paid by consumer i, Priceijt 
is the everyday price consumer i pays for brand j in week t, 
Promijt is a dummy variable for the presence of a price pro- 
motion, and Dscntijt denotes the value of the price promo- 
tion. The consumer's inventory of brand j at the beginning of 
week t, Invijt, is given by 
(6)t = ijt = Invij(t- 1) + qijt- Cijt. 
The variable qijt is the purchase quantity during period t. We 
calculate consumption, Cijt, on the basis of previous 
research (Gupta 1988; see also Ailawadi and Neslin 1998), 
except we keep track of consumption and inventory at the 
brand level. We first calculate Cit, total category consump- 
tion in each week, as Cit = 
min(_ lInvijt, 
Ci), where Ci is 
consumer i's average weekly consumption calculated from 
the data (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998; Gupta 1988). The cal- 
culation shows that the consumer will consume Ci as long as 
he or she has that much inventory on hand. To calculate Cijt, 
we assume that if the consumer has positive inventory of 
various brands, he or she consumes the brands in order of 
preference (Vijt). Given that Invijt is the inventory of brand j 
at time t, 81i6 = Invijt measures total holding cost; 81i denotes 
unit holding cost. In addition, I(= Invijt - Ci) is an indi- 
cator function equal to 1 when 11 
qlInvijt 
< Ci and equal to 
0 otherwise. This captures stockout costs (for a more thor- 
ough treatment, see Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003). The 
combination of Equations 2, 4, and 5 yields the following: 
J 
(7) Uit = V[ijtCijt- li(Priceijt- PromijtDscntijt)dijt] 
j=l 
- 
txli li Invijt 
- 
xli2iI Invijt 
- Ci + 
Oxliyit. j=1 j= 1 
We add a few adjustments to Equation 7. First, note that 
ali represents price response. Previous researchers have 
found that response to changes in regular price is different 
from response to promotional price discounts (Guadagni 
and Little 1983; Mulhern and Leone 1991). We allow for the 
possibility of having differential response to price promo- 
tions and regular price by introducing a new parameter, a4. 
Second, we set -cli6li = c5i, where a5i represents the 
change in utility from increasing inventory by one unit. 
Third, we set -Cli2i = x6i, where x6i represents the change 
in utility if the consumer is out of stock. Fourth, note that 
choices are mutually exclusive so that 1j = odijt = 1, and 








- Ci) + liYit. Therefore, yit, 
which does not change across alternatives, is independent of 
dijt and will not affect brand choice or the category decision. 
We therefore treat it as a constant and set it equal to zero 
(Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003)5 and thus can state our util- 
ity function as follows: 









We model promotion availability and consumer percep- 
tions of promotion availability. As do Gntil and Srinivasan 
(1996) and Assunqdo and Meyer (1993), we assume that 
promotion of each brand-size follows a first-order Markov 
process and is independent across alternatives:6 
(9) Prob(Promjt = lIPromj(t-1) = 1) = tj1, and 
(10) Prob(Promjt = lIPromj(t -1) = 0) = tjo, 
for j = 1 ..., J, where 
jl 
denotes the probability of promo- 
tion in period t, given that there was promotion in period t - 
1 for brand-size j. Similarly, itjo denotes the probability of 
promotion in period t, given that there was no promotion in 
period t - 1. The parameters describe the frequencies and the 
4Note that we include inventory costs in the budget constraint, which is 
equivalent to including it directly in the utility function. For a similar treat- 
ment, see Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003). 
5We can relax this assumption and allow total shopping expenditure to 
affect purchase decision by assuming a nonlinear utility function. We leave 
modeling expenditure effect for further research. 
6We checked this assumption by calculating and comparing Equations 9 
and 10 and then doing the same using Promj(t - 2) instead of Prom(t - 1). We 
found that the t - 1 conditionals were different whereas the t - 2 condition- 
als were virtually the same. For example, for the Heinz 14 oz. bottle, 
Prob(Promjt= 1IPromj(t- 1)= 1) 
= .02, whereas Prob(Promjt 
= 1IPromj(t - 1)= 
0) = .06 (the chance of a promotion in week t is greater if the brand-size has 
not just been promoted). The second-order conditionals for this brand-size 
are Prob(Promjt = 1 IPromj(t - 2) = 1) = .05 and Prob(Promjt = lIPromj(t - 2) = 
1) = .05, or virtually identical. Similar patterns hold for the other brand- 
sizes. 
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temporal correlation of promotions over time. We assume 
that consumers learn these probabilities; G6ntil and Srini- 
vasan (1996), who also estimate a structural model, find evi- 
dence that consumers can do so, as do Krishna, Currim, and 
Shoemaker (1991), who use a consumer survey. 
Note that the utility function (Equation 8) and perceptions 
of promotion availability imply that loyal consumers are 
especially likely to adjust purchase timing (e.g., by acceler- 
ation). Consider the consumer who enters the store in time t 
and finds Brand A on promotion. The consumer does not 
need to buy the product category now (inventory is high) 
and realizes that doing so only adds inventory costs in the 
future. However, the consumer realizes that because the 
brand is on promotion now, it may not be next week, and by 
buying now, the consumer can ensure future consumption of 
Brand A. This future consumption benefit is especially high 
for consumers who prefer Brand A, and that is why they are 
intrinsically more likely to adjust purchase timing. Timing 
adjustment by loyal purchasers is the key intuitive reason for 
the upward bias in switching estimates; in taking this phe- 
nomenon into account, the dynamic structural model should 
provide more accurate switching estimates. 
Our focus is the impact of promotion on brand switching, 
so it is natural that we model consumer promotion expecta- 
tions rather than price expectations. Our emphasis on pro- 
motion expectations is also based on the following reasons: 
First, modeling price expectations would add more com- 
plexity by increasing the size of the dynamic program state 
space. Second, including these expectations would only 
make our case stronger, because there would be even more 
consumer adjustment of purchase timing. Third, the three 
price-related quantities are regular price (Priceijt), availabil- 
ity of a promotion (Promijt), and depth of a promotion 
(Dscntijt). We believe that consumers are most likely to form 
expectations for the availability of a promotion. Krishna, 
Currim, and Shoemaker (1991) find that consumers are 
more likely to have opinions of promotion frequency than 
promotion depth. Fourth, the variation in regular price per 
ounce was fairly small in our data (mean and standard devi- 
ations are $.0561 and $.0015, $.0389 and $.0017, $.0461 
and $.0015, $.0480 and $.0016, $.0274 and $.0010, and 
$.0349 and $.0014 for the six brand-size combinations in 
our application). So plus or minus two standard deviations is 
on the order of an 8% change, whereas the average price 
promotion discount is on the order of a 15% to 30% change. 
Finally, we assume that it is easier to learn the probability of 
promotion on the next occasion conditional on current pro- 
motion than to learn the likelihood of a change in regular 
shelf price. Therefore, it is more rational to make the effort 
to learn when promotions will be available because it is eas- 
ier and the payoff is higher. 
The simplest way to incorporate future prices when solv- 
ing consumers' dynamic programs is to treat the prices con- 
stant over the time horizon. Gt~ntil and Srinivasan (1996) fol- 
low this approach. We instead represent the prices as random 
draws from a normal distribution with mean and variance 
specific to the brand. The mean and variance remain con- 
stant over time. The results we report in this article use this 
specification. We also follow a similar approach for depth of 
promotions. We observe that constant prices yield similar 
parameter estimates and identical managerial implications. 
The solution to the dynamic program defined by Equation 
1 and the specification of our utility function is such that at 
any time period and given any state, the optimal solution is 
the solution to the dynamic program from that time forward. 
The consumer's optimal choice is thus the solution to the 
Bellman equation: 
(11) Vit(Lastit,Invit,Promit) = max E YST-tUiT dijt T= t 
= maxfUit + 8Et [Vi(t +1)(Lasti(t +1), Invi(t +1), Promi(t +1)]1 d ijt 
There are three state variables: last purchase, inventory, and 
promotion; Lastit, Invit, and Promit are vectors that denote 
consumer i's previous choice, inventory, and current promo- 
tion status for all brands, respectively. The value function 
Vit depends on the state at time t for consumer i. It is the 
maximum expected discounted consumption utility for a 
consumer who makes decisions about purchase incidence 
and brand choice given Invit units of current inventory, last 
purchase Lastit, and observed promotion Promit. 
Heterogeneity and Estimation 
Previous research suggests that consumers are heteroge- 
neous in their preferences, sensitivities to marketing-mix 
variables, holding costs, and stockout costs (e.g., Allenby 
and Rossi 1991; Chang, Siddarth, and Weinberg 1999; 
G6ntil and Srinivasan 1993; Kamakura and Russell 1989; 
Krishna, Currim, and Shoemaker 1991). It is also known 
that ignoring unobserved consumer heterogeneity may lead 
to biased parameter estimates (Heckman 1981). Let (pi 
denote a vector of length J + 5 that represents consumer i's 
utility parameters ((Xli, (X2ij, (X3i, (4i, 5i, (X6i)T for j = 1, 
.... J, where T denotes the transpose. Then, we assume that pi is 
multivariate normally distributed with the following mean 
vector and covariance matrix: 
(12) -i- 
N(90, 9), 
where po = (a1, a21' 
...., 
2J, a3, (X4, X5, a6) is the mean of 
pi, and Xp is a variance-covariance matrix of dimension J + 
5 in which the diagonal elements denote the corresponding 
variance of each parameter. Thus, we need to estimate the 
mean and variance for each of these parameters. In addition, 
we capture the potential for loyal users to be more promo- 
tion sensitive by allowing the intrinsic preference a2ij and 
promotion coefficients (a4i) to be correlated with correlation 
p. Thus, all the off-diagonal elements of lp except p are 
constrained to be zero. A positive (negative) p indicates that 
consumers who like the brand are more (less) promotion 




forj = 1, ..., J represent 
all the parameters to be estimated. We then have the proba- 
bility of choosing brand j conditional on pi and 0 (Pijt0,qi]): 
(13) Pijt(e, pi) = Prob(dijt = 10, (pi). 
We assume that the value function of choice j is distributed 
by an i.i.d. error term tijt, which follows an extreme value 
distribution. The probability of consumer i making a 
sequence of purchase decisions dijt, j = 0, ..., J is given by 
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(14) Pi(, (Pi) 
= 17 l 
dijtPijt(O, (Pi)-t j 
Integration over the distribution of (pi yields the likelihood of 
observing consumer i's sequence of purchase decisions: 
(15) Pi(6) = E[Pijt(0, qPoi)O] 
= 11 17 
dijtPijt(O, (pi)f pi 6O)d(pi, 
t 1t 
where ( is the domain of the previous integration, and 
f(@pi|) is the multivariate normal probability distribution 
function for yi conditional on 0. Thus, the log-likelihood 
function to be maximized is 
(16) log L(6) = log[Pi (0)]. 
i=1 
There is no closed-form solution for the underlying pur- 
chase probabilities in Equation 13. In addition, calculating 
Equation 15 requires computation of multiple integrals. The 
dimension of the integrals is too large for traditional numer- 
ical integration methods; instead, we use simulated maxi- 
mum likelihood, which employs Monte Carlo methods to 
simulate the integrals rather than evaluate them numerically 
(Keane 1993; McFadden 1989; Pakes 1986). Because inven- 
tory is continuous, we have the problem of a large state 
space. We adopt Keane and Wolpin's (1994) interpolation 
method by calculating the value functions for a few state 
space points and using these to estimate the coefficients of 
an interpolation regression. We then use the interpolation 
regression function to provide values for the expected max- 
ima at any other state points for which values are needed in 
the backward recursion solution process. 
The adoption of simulation and interpolation significantly 
reduces the computation burden, which also enables us to 
take into account unobserved consumer heterogeneity. We 
begin the simulation with a starting value for 0. Next, we 
draw a set of parameters for a given consumer. We then 
solve the dynamic programming problem for the entire time 
span. We repeat the process for that same consumer, with a 
different set of pi. This generates Pijt. We then go through 
this process for the next consumer. After all consumers are 
finished, we have Pijt for each consumer, and we can calcu- 
late the likelihood function. Using simulation, we then 
numerically calculate gradients and obtain a new 9. We 
repeat the entire process until we can no longer improve the 
likelihood function.7 
Reduced-Form Models 
We compare our structural model with several conven- 
tional reduced-form models that are used to study consumer 
response to promotion. Using a multinomial logit model, we 
model the conditional probability that a household chooses 
brand j. The probability of choosing brand j given that a pur- 
chase is made is 





(18) Wilt = -xliPriceijt + 2ij + oX3iLastijt 
+ 
X4iPromijtDscntijt. 
Note that Equation 18 corresponds to the structural model in 
its specification of intrinsic preference, state dependence, 
price, and price promotion. However, it does not consider 
purchase incidence or dynamic decision making. 
Nested logit is one method for modeling purchase inci- 
dence, though it does not explicitly model optimal dynamic 
decision making. In this framework, the probability of cate- 
gory purchase incidence depends on the expected maximum 
utility from the brand-choice decision. This expected maxi- 
mum utility is given by CatVal = log(IJ lewit), which 
reflects the established brand preferences and marketing 
activity in the category at purchase occasion t (Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman 1985). Purchase incidence is then represented as 
R* 
eRit 









+ 34iI InVijt - Ci +5iPromTimeit. 
tj=lt 
We define inventory and consumption as we did previously. 
The variable PromTimeit represents the time since the last 
promotion. It is meant to capture that consumers may hold 
out until the next promotion in a reduced-form sense (Mela, 
Jedidi, and Bowman 1998).8 To calculate PromTimeit, we 
calculate the average time between promotions in the cate- 
gory, which is 1.6 weeks. If the time since the latest promo- 
tion in the category seen by consumer i is greater than half 
the average, PromTimeit equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0. 
Given this definition, we expect P5i to be negative. The like- 








1.*.R 1 + e 




1+ eR jt 
where Dijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if brand j is 
chosen by consumer i in week t, and Dit is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the product category is purchased by con- 
sumer i on trip t. 
We examine two additional models of incidence and 
choice. First is a logit model with no-purchase as an alter- 
7Note that taking into account unobserved heterogeneity assuming con- 
tinuous heterogeneity distribution requires the dynamic programming prob- 
lem to be solved for each draw. A simpler treatment of heterogeneity is 
latent class approach, as Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) adopt. 
8Note that including the variable PromTime in the nested logit model 
enables consumers to consider a next-period promotion possibility when 
making a purchase decision that maximizes their current utility. It is far too 
simple and ad hoc to capture the complicated decision process generated by 
forward-looking behavior and its interaction with promotion expectations. 
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native (Chiang 1991; Erdem and Keane 1996; Erdem and 
Sun 2002). Our motivation for considering this model is to 
make the purchase incidence model more similar to our 
model, which also treats no-purchase as a distinct alterna- 
tive. Second, we estimate a static version of our model. This 
assumes the discount factor 8 = 0, so consumers do not con- 
sider future periods. Accordingly, we also do not include 
inventory and stockout costs because they require dynamic 
optimization on the part of the consumer. 
ANALYSES 
Synthetic Data Simulation 
In our first analysis, we simulate synthetic data using the 
structural model with a known set of parameters, and we 
estimate various logit models and the structural model on 
these data. We intend to show that if consumers follow a 
rational purchase strategy, conventional logit models over- 
estimate brand switching due to promotion. 
We generate the data from our proposed dynamic struc- 
tural model for 200 consumers during a 50-week horizon. In 
essence, we assume that the structural model is the "true" 
model. There are two brands with market shares of 70% and 
30%. Table 1 shows the true parameter values for generating 
the synthetic data. We compare five models: (1) a logit 
choice model with brand preference, price, and promotion 
as independent variables; (2) a nested logit model; (3) a logit 
model with no purchase as a choice alternative; (4) the static 
version of our dynamic model;9 and (5) the dynamic 
model. 10 
Table 1, Column 2, shows the true parameter values 
(mean and standard deviations) for the synthetic data. 
Columns 3-7 report the average mean and average standard 
deviations over 100 simulations for each parameter. Table 1 
shows the following: First, the structural model is estimated 
correctly; the average estimated parameters in Column 7 
correspond to the true parameters. Second, the nonstructural 
models consistently overestimated the coefficient for pro- 
motion. The upward bias is highest for the logit model and 
lower for the three choice/incidence models. The results 
conform to our expectations but do not clearly demonstrate 
an upward bias in switching elasticities, which can be equal 
even if the raw coefficients are unequal (Ailawadi, Gedenk, 
and Neslin 1999). 
We calculate promotion-switching elasticity as the per- 
centage change in purchase probability of brand j with and 
without promotion, conditional on category purchase, for 
consumer i for brand j at week t: 
(22) esijt = Prob(dijt = ldiot = 0, Promijt = 1) 
- 
Prob(dijt = ldiot = 0, Promijt = 0)] 
/Prob(dijt = Idiot = 0, Promijt 
= 0). 
We calculate this quantity for each household for brand j for 
an arbitrarily selected Week 8, a week when Brand 1 was not 
promoted. We simulate promotion availability and use aver- 
age price discount to represent present promotion depth. We 
use 100 random draws to simulate consumer heterogeneity. 
Note that to make the promotion elasticities comparable 
across models, we calculate the preceding equation for the 
same consumers for each model, specifically the consumers 
who make a category purchase in Week 8 in the no-promotion 
case. In this way, we focus only on the brand-switching 
aspects of the various models. To complement the switching 
elasticity, we also calculate the percentage of the immediate 
sales "bump" that is due to switching rather than acceleration 
or deceleration.11 This quantity is comparable to that calcu- 
lated by other researchers who investigate the switching 
effect of promotions (e.g., Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 
1999; Gupta 1988). Using the same simulation method as we 
do to calculate the switching elasticity, we classify 
promotion-week incremental purchases as brand switches 
(A), accelerated purchases (B), and decelerated purchases 
(C). The switching percentage is thus A/(A + B + C). 
Table 1 presents the switching and switching percentage 
results and shows the following: First, logit models overes- 
timate promotion elasticities more than the structural model. 
The t-tests show that the differences are significant. We use 
the word "overestimate" because the structural model is the 
true model, we estimate its coefficients accurately with that 
model, and its elasticities are therefore the true elasticities. 
Second, all the reduced-form models overestimate the 
brand-switching effect. The upward bias is highest for the 
stand-alone logit choice model and second highest for the 
nested logit model with purchase incidence. Logit with no- 
purchase options and the static structural models also result 
in higher switching elasticities. 
The results suggest that logit choice models overestimate 
the brand-switching effect of promotions. The addition of 
purchase incidence helps alleviate this bias but not com- 
pletely, apparently because the incidence models are a 
reduced form of dynamic decision making. Therefore, such 
a model does not fully capture the consumer's rational pur- 
chase strategy and confounds switching with purchase 
timing. 
Empirical Application 
Data. We used ketchup data collected by ACNielsen.12 
The calibration sample consists of 8823 observations of 173 
households that made 1473 purchases of ketchup during 51 
weeks from 1986 to 1988 in Sioux Falls, S.Dak. We 
excluded occasional purchasers by randomly selecting 
households that made more than 4 purchases of ketchup dur- 
ing the 51 weeks. We also only chose households that pur- 
chased at most one unit of ketchup on each purchase occa- 
sion; single-unit purchasers represent 98% of all households 
9This is a structural model that assumes immediate utility maximization. 
Consumers do not take into account future utilities. We therefore assume 
the discount parameter 8 = 0 and that there are no inventory effects. 
10Note that to simplify, we assumed for the simulation that consumers 
know future regular prices. This assumption is relaxed in our empirical 
application, in which we assume that consumers view future regular prices 
as random draws from a normal distribution with constant mean and vari- 
ance over time. 
11Note that we cannot calculate this quantity for the stand-alone logit 
models or the static structural model because these models either do not 
consider purchase displacement (logit) or do not enable consumers to 
accelerate or decelerate purchases (static structural). However, it provides a 
useful basis for comparing the nested logit and no-purchase option logit 
with the dynamic structural model. 
12A reason for using ketchup data is that the consumption rate is relative 
insensitive to promotion, as Ailawadi and Neslin (1998) show. However, for 
other product categories, ignoring flexible consumption rate may also cause 
overestimation of brand-switching elasticities. This supports our findings. 
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Table 1 
SIMULATION BASED ON SYNTHETIC DATA 
Logit with Static Dynamic 
No-Purchase Structural Structural 
Logita Nested Logit Alternative Model Model 
Parameters True Valuesa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Price -a, -2.00 -3.40 (.34) -2.68 (.16) -2.61 (.22) -2.30 (.19) -2.22 (.21) 
1.00 1.26 (.27) 1.34 (.44) 1.10 (.44) 1.03 (.25) 1.01 (.26) 
Brand preference oC2 
Brand 1 -.50 2.51 (.29) 1.57 (.41) -.55 (.14) -.55 (.20) -.54 (.19) 
.50 1.16 (.24) .91 (.49) .56 (.15) .54 (.09) .52 (.07) 
Brand 2 -1.00 -1.08 (.26) -1.07 (.20) -1.07 (.18) 
.50 .51 (.19) .48 (.22) .50 (.20) 
Promotion a4 1.50 2.77 (.20) 2.05 (.33) 2.09 (.24) 1.74 (.24) 1.51 (.18) 
1.00 1.19 (.21) 1.43 (.25) 1.31 (.35) .98 (.30) .94 (.24) 
Unit inventory cost a05 
-.10 -.06(.03) -.08(.04) 
.05 .05 (.02) .05 (.02) 
Stockout cost (X6 -.20 -.22(.10) -.18(.07) 
.05 .06 (.02) .06 (.02) 
lo0 .50 .55 (.13) 
tE1 .25 .26(.11) 
T20 .30 .33 (.09) 
Rt21 .15 .16 (.07) 
Purchase Incidence 
Category preference t0 1.24 (.20) 
.13 (.06) 
Consumption P .69(.25) .62(.18) 
.25 (.10) .30 (.09) 
Category value P2 .58 (.23) 
.31 (.15) 
Unit inventory cost 33 -.08 (.03) 
.03 (.04) 
Stockout cost 34 -.03 (.02) 
.02 (.03) 
Marginal Promotion of Brand 1 in Week 8 
Short-term promotional switching 
elasticities .351 (.044) .275 (.027) .266 (.021) .237 (.019) .198 (.015) 
Long-term promotional switching 
elasticities .164(.023) .156(.027) .130(.016) .121 (.013) .101 (.011) 
Breakdown of Short-Term Promotion Effect 
Brand switching N.A. 72% 69% N.A. 56% 
Purchase displacement 28% 31% 44% 
Increased Promotion Perception (i) of Brand 1 by 50% 
Percentage change of Brand 1 aggregate 
sales 
.222 (.029) .186 (.025) .187 (.025) .099 (.017) .054 (.016) 
aNumbers in the first and second lines are the means and standard deviations of each generated parameter. 
Notes: N.A. = not applicable. Number of households = 200; number of weeks = 50; number of observations = 10,000; number of simulations = 100. Num- 
bers not in parentheses are estimated parameters; numbers in parentheses are the standard error of the corresponding parameters. The results are obtained on 
the basis of 100 simulations. Average means, standard deviations, and their standard errors are reported over 100 simulations. The standard deviation of 
promotion-switching elasticities are reported in parentheses. To test whether the elasticities differences among Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are statistically sig- 
nificant, we performed t-tests for the first brand. The t-values are 4.12, 4.26, 3.97, 3.86, and 4.06 for short-term marginal promotion elasticities; 4.18, 3.96, 
4.21, 4.19, and 4.40 for long-term marginal promotion elasticities; and 4.85, 4.75, 5.36, 4.86, and 5.02 for policy-change elasticities. 
and 96% of all purchase occasions. We selected six leading 
brand-sizes that constitute more than 85% of the (unit) mar- 
ket share: Heinz 14 oz., 28 oz. and 32 oz., 40 oz. and 44 oz., 
and 64 oz.; Hunt's 32 oz.; and Del Monte 28 oz. and 32 oz. 
We grouped similar sizes (e.g., 28 oz. and 32 oz., 40 oz. and 
44 oz.) together to reduce the computation burden. The six 
sizes we considered cover more than 98% of the sales of the 
three brands in our study. Table 2 reports descriptive statis- 
tics. The average price per oz. is $.0561, $.0389, $.0461, 
$.0480, $.0274, and $.0349 for the six brand-sizes. Average 
category purchase is 5.344 ozs. per week. We reserved an 
additional 4131 observations of 81 households that made 
647 purchase of ketchup during 51 weeks in Springfield, 
Mo., for holdout sample validation. In estimating the mod- 
els, we quantified price, price discount, and inventory rela- 
tive to a 32 oz. bottle. Thus, if a consumer purchased a 44 
oz. bottle, there is 1.375 addition to inventory (qijt = 1.375). 
This is a matter of rescaling that does not affect the results. 
We chose the ketchup category because it is a product that 
consumers can use flexibly and that has relatively low hold- 
ing costs. It is also a well-promoted category. As a result, 
ketchup is a category for which consumers can plan their 
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Table 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KETCHUP DATA 
Store Special Price 
Brand Name Market Share Mean Price per Ouncea Frequency Mean 
Heinz 14 oz. (1) 4.31% 5.61 5.8% .896 
Heinz 28 oz. and 32 oz. (2) 39.68% 3.89 19.0% 1.114 
Heinz 40 oz. and 44 oz. (3) 5.14% 4.61 8.5% 1.022 
Heinz 64 oz. (4) 3.37% 4.80 10.9% 1.201 
Hunt's 32 oz. (5) 13.52% 2.74 12.5% .481 
Del Monte 28 oz. and 32 oz. (6) 19.47% 3.49 18.1% 1.065 
(85.49%) 
aln the estimation, we scaled the prices relative to 32 ozs. 
Notes: We selected frequent ketchup users who made at least five purchases during the 51 weeks. The average sample category purchase is .167 bottle per 
week. The average category purchase is .043 bottle per week in the original data from ERIM. 
purchasing. Most of the purchases are single unit, and con- 
sumption is relatively stable, as Ailawadi and Neslin (1998) 
demonstrate. Ketchup therefore seems an ideal category, 
though certainly not an atypical one, for illustrating rational 
consumer planning. 
We operationalized price as regular, everyday shelf price. 
We follow Abraham and Lodish (1987) to construct the 
price discount, Dscntijt. We defined promo equal to 1 if there 
was a price discount in that week and equal to 0 otherwise. 
We defined Last equal to 1 for the brand-size that was cho- 
sen most recently and equal to 0 otherwise (see Ailawadi, 
Gedenk, and Neslin 1999; Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chin- 
tagunta 1999).13 The 8 is fixed at .995 (Erdem and Keane 
1996).14 
Comparative model fit. The fit statistics for both in- 
sample (calibration) and out-of-sample (holdout) are pro- 
vided in Table 3. Because choice models (Model 1 and 2) 
and choice/incidence models (Models 3-7) fit data to differ- 
ent model structures (incidence and/or brand), the overall 
log-likelihood values and Bayesian information criteria 
(BICs) are not directly comparable. Thus, we also report the 
log-likelihood values of the brand choice component for the 
nested logits (Models 3 and 4) to compare the performance 
of various reduced-form choice models. In terms of this 
choice component, model fit improves from Model 1 to 
Model 4; Model 4 is the best-fitting choice model. We then 
compared the overall log-likelihood value and BICs for 
Models 3-7. The overall log-likelihood (absolute) value and 
BICs are lower for Model 7 than for Models 3-6, indicating 
that the dynamic model fits data the best.15 Holdout sample 
fit statistics support this finding. To better assess the fit of 
each model, we report predicted average probabilities and 
counts of each choice alternative in comparison with the 
sample frequency and sample count of the calibrated sam- 
ple. In addition, we report the percentage of correctly pre- 
dicted choice alternatives and Efron's R2 for both the cali- 
bration sample and the holdout sample.16 These indexes 
paint the same picture. The comparison of Models 6 and 7 
suggests that the static version of our model performs worse 
than the dynamic version, which suggests that dynamics 
indeed matter. 
Overall, the dynamic structural model fits better than the 
other models in terms of log-likelihood, BIC, and hit rates 
for the calibration and holdout samples.17 This suggests that 
our proposed model provides a better description for con- 
sumer rational purchase behavior in the ketchup category. 
Models 3-5 underperform the forward-looking model 
because they try to capture the dynamics of consumer 
rational strategy by an exogenously imposed statistical rela- 
tionship. The assumed relationship is too simple and ad hoc 
to incorporate the complex effects of purchase timing and 
forward-looking inventory effects. The choice models 
(Models 1 and 2) ignore purchase timing and cannot com- 
pletely capture consumer rational purchase strategy. The 
static structural model (Model 6) performs worse than the 
dynamic model because the former leaves out all the 
dynamics. 
Estimated coefficients. Table 4 reports the estimation 
results of the seven competing models; mean parameter esti- 
mates are reported in the first line, and the standard devia- 
tion estimates across households are reported in the second 
line. We first focus on the structural model (Model 7). All 
the mean coefficients are significant and have expected 
signs. The standard deviations are also significant for all 
coefficients except that for stockout cost. This provides evi- 
dence that consumers are heterogeneous. Brand- 
consumption preferences for the six brand-size combina- 
tions are also significantly estimated, and there are 
indications of significant heterogeneity in preference. The 
significance of the last purchase parameter reinforces the 
3We estimated all the reduced-form models with smoothed use experi- 
ence ("BLOY," or brand loyalty, as in Guadagni and Little's [1983] study). 
There is some improvement of log-likelihood value and BIC, but it does not 
affect the estimation of other parameters significantly. Comparison of the 
model estimation can be obtained from the authors. 
14Although the 51-week time horizon seems long, we note that the dis- 
counted factor implies that the distant time periods are less important than 
immediate time periods. 
15Akaike information criterion is calculated as -lnL + number of param- 
eters, and BIC is calculated as -lnL + (number of parameters)/2 x In(num- 
ber of observations). 
16Efron's R2 is calculated as follows: 
1 - i= 1 t= 1 j 
-- 








j= 1 (Yijt - ijt )2 
It conveys the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variable and is a more reliable model selec- 
tion criterion for discrete-choice models (Amemiya 1985). 
l7Note that the holdout sample consists of households in a different city 
than the calibration sample households, so this predictive validity test is 
more stringent than predicting the choices of the same households in a dif- 
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existence of state dependence in brand preference. The 
results also show that price has a negative impact on pur- 
chase, and promotion increases the attractiveness of the 
price discount, as we expected. 
The coefficients for inventory and stockout costs are neg- 
ative and significant, as we expected. In monetary terms, the 
holding cost is equivalent to a weekly price reduction of .05/ 
.44 = $. 11. Given an average price of approximately $1.25 
per bottle, a consumer would be indifferent between a 20% 
price cut ($.25) and holding a 32 oz. bottle of ketchup in 
inventory for slightly longer than two weeks. This shows 
much flexibility in that the consumer would be willing to 
stockpile a bottle of ketchup even if it meant it was not going 
to be consumed immediately. 
The estimates of the promotion expectations are sensible. 
The estimated perceived conditional probability of a promo- 
tion in period t, given that there was not a promotion in 
period t - 1, is greater than the probability if there was a pro- 
motion in period t - 1. The implied promotion frequencies, 
calculated as l0j/(1 + tjo - tjl), are 7.0%, 19.0%, 9.5%, 
7.0%, 12.9%, and 15.7% for the six brand-sizes, respec- 
tively, which correspond nicely to the observed frequencies 
in Table 2 (Heinz 64 oz. is the one exception). Overall, these 
results are notable: They show that the estimated perceived 
promotion transition probabilities recover the actual promo- 
tion frequencies rather well. This suggests that consumers 
indeed learn the promotion schedule. The correlation 
between brand preference and promotion response is posi- 
tive, showing that consumers who have a higher-than- 
average intrinsic preference for a particular ketchup brand 
are also more promotion sensitive than average. Thus, 
brand-loyal customers are more likely to adjust their pur- 
chase timing to meet the promotion schedule of their 
favorite brand. 
We now focus on the purchase incidence parameters in 
Model 4. The inventory and stockout variables are negative, 
as we expected (though only weakly statistically signifi- 
cant). The positive estimate of CatValit shows that con- 
sumers are more likely to accelerate purchase on promotion; 
the negative estimate of PromTimeit implies that consumers 
delay their purchase until next promotion with the belief that 
the longer the time since the last promotion, the higher is the 
probability of promotion in the next period. The CatValit 
variable is standard for nested logit models, but the Prom- 
Timeit variable is relatively new. Our results support its 
inclusion as an ad hoc way to model deceleration. 
Finally, the promotion coefficient was consistently higher 
as we moved from the structural model to Model 5 and 
through to Model 1. These results are similar to our syn- 
thetic data simulation. We next turn to estimated elasticities 
and switching percentages to determine whether the logit, 
nested logit, and nondynamic structural models produce 
greater switching effects. 
Estimated elasticities and switching percentages. Table 5 
shows the comparative short-term and long-term switching 
elasticities and percentage breakdown of switching versus 
purchase displacement for a marginal promotion of Heinz 
28 oz. and 32 oz. in Week 11. It also reports sales elastici- 
ties when the promotion perceptions of Heinz 28 oz. and 32 
oz. are increased by 50%. The results are quite similar to our 
simulation in that the switching effects are consistently 
higher for the logit, nested logit, logit with no-purchase 
option, and static structural models than for the dynamic 
structural model. The nondynamic models infer more brand 
switching than does the dynamic structural model. Given 
our concerns about not taking into account consumer 
rational timing adjustments and given our previous simula- 
tion results, the empirical results suggest that reduced-form 
models overstate switching effects compared with a 
dynamic structural model. 
It is notable that there is not much difference between the 
two logit choice models or among the four reduced-form 
choice/incidence models, though PromTime seems to help. 
The key seems to be the addition of purchase incidence, but 
how incidence is added does not make much of a difference, 
except in the dynamic structural model. 
The difference between the reduced-form choice/inci- 
dence models and the structural model is managerially 
meaningful. The difference in short-term brand-switching 
elasticities between Model 5 and the structural Model 7 is 
.346 - .242 = .104. That means that Model 5 finds an addi- 
tional 10.4% change in base probabilities compared with the 
structural model. Assuming a base of roughly .40 purchase 
probability for Heinz 28 oz./32 oz. (its market share) means 
a difference in .104 x .40 = 4.16 share points. A share point 
in the ketchup category is worth roughly $3 million dollars 
in revenue, so the difference between these models is a mat- 
ter of $12.5 million, or $240,000 per week.18 The difference 
between the logit choice models and the structural model is 
.426 - .242 = .184 x .40 = 7.4 share points, or $22.1 million, 
or $424,615 per week. These are managerially meaningful 
differences (see, e.g., Abraham and Lodish 1987). 
Policy-Change Analysis 
Senior managers are often more interested in evaluating 
the effect of a significant change in promotion policy rather 
than the effect of marginal promotion. It is in this area that 
we expect the dynamic structural model to distinguish itself 
even more from the nondynamic models, because the struc- 
tural model explicitly takes into account the promotion pol- 
icy through the frequency perception coefficients, n. Keane 
(1997a, p. 312) states our expectations best: "To success- 
fully forecast behavior after a regime change one needs to 
model how agents tailor their decision rules to particular 
regimes. One needs a so-called 'structural' model whose 
parameters are 'primitives' of agents' preferences, informa- 
tion processing systems,... which remain fixed across 
regimes." 
We expect that the structural model will predict less of a 
gain in market share than the other models for the brand that 
experiences a quantum increase in promotion frequency. 
This is because these models do not explicitly enable con- 
sumers to adjust their purchase timing as a function of the 
firm's overall promotion policy. The choice/incidence mod- 
els try to achieve this by including inventory and ad hoc 
variables such as PromTimeijt, but they do not do as com- 
plete a job as the structural model, which models rational 
consumer adjustments explicitly in a dynamic programming 
framework. 
We run a simulation in which we increase the actual pro- 
motion frequencies of Heinz 28 oz./32 oz. by 50% and 
18Source: Information Resources (1995). Volume of mustard and 
ketchup per 1000 households is 5916 units; ketchup accounts for 77% of 
the category and is priced at $.73 per unit. The assumption of 90 million 
households translates to a category sales volume of $5,916 x .77 x .73 x 
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assume that perceived promotion frequencies also increase 
by that amount in the dynamic structural model (t20 and 
c21).-19 Given that the base promotion frequency is 19% for 
Heinz 28 oz./32 oz., we randomly select 10% more of the 
weeks when there was no promotion, assume that there were 
promotions running in those weeks, and calculate the pre- 
dicted percentage change in Heinz 28 oz./32 oz. sales. The 
results in Table 5 confirm our expectations. The logit and 
nested logit models all predict substantially greater 
increases in sales than the dynamic structural model, and the 
results are even more dramatic than those for a marginal 
additional promotion. The predicted sales changes for Heinz 
28 oz./32 oz. are more than double for the nonstructural 
models compared with the dynamic structural model. For 
example, the nested logit model with PromTime predicts a 
19.1% increase in sales, whereas the structural model pre- 
dicts only an 8.5% increase. 
The results suggest that reduced-form models signifi- 
cantly overestimate the effectiveness of a policy increase in 
promotion frequency because they do not explicitly enable 
consumers to adjust their purchase timing strategies ration- 
ally in response to the new regime, and they assume the 
same promotion sensitivities hold for the new regime. 
Limitations 
As we noted in the model development section, we 
assume a simple mechanism for consumers' future price 
expectations. We focused on expectations of promotions; 
notably, regular price variations were quite modest (see 
"Model Specification"). Therefore, we resorted to a simpli- 
fying assumption to enhance the computational feasibility of 
our model. Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) and Hendel and 
Nevo (2002) systematically examine the price expectation 
process. A comprehensive specification of both price and 
promotion expectations is desirable, particularly when ana- 
lyzing a category in which price fluctuations are consider- 
able. We hope to address this issue in a future research 
effort. 
We also implicitly assume that consumers expect promo- 
tions to be independent across alternatives. Erdem, Imai, 
and Keane (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2002) find that the 
promotions across alternatives may be correlated. A simple 
pairwise empirical analysis shows that only 5 of the 15 aver- 
age within-store correlations among our six brand-sizes are 
significantly different from 0. The magnitude of the signifi- 
cant ones ranges from -.16 to .27. As part of increasing the 
sophistication of consumer expectations, we might select a 
higher-order Markov model that allows for covariation in 
promotions across alternatives. This would complicate the 
model development significantly; however, it would be a 
worthy topic for further research. In the interim, we conjec- 
ture that any better specification of consumer expectations 
should strengthen the findings reported here. As consumers 
hold more sophisticated expectations of the firms' promo- 
tional strategies, they will become more adept at adjusting 
their purchase timing, which increases the need for dynamic 
rational models to unravel purchase-timing decisions from 
brand switching. 
Finally, we have assumed that the consumption rate is 
deterministic. As a result, the advent of a stockout is deter- 
ministic. This happens because our model predicts the same 
choices for households with identical purchase histories and 
holds taste parameters constant. This may result in a bias in 
elasticities (for details, see Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003). 
With six alternatives, the possibility of identical purchase 
histories should decrease as the purchase history increases. 
Given the long history for each household in our model, we 
believe that the bias arising from deterministic consumption 
should be minimal. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The themes of this article are that logit decision models 
can overestimate the extent of promotion-induced brand 
switching because they do not completely account for con- 
sumers' rational adjustments in purchase timing and that a 
dynamic structural model can address this problem. We have 
investigated this thesis by developing a dynamic structural 
model of choice and incidence and comparing it with a 
stand-alone logit choice model, a nested logit model with 
incidence, a logit model with a no-purchase alternative, and 
a static version of the dynamic model. The dynamic model 
differs from these reduced-form static models by explicitly 
modeling the process by which consumers decide what and 
when to purchase, taking into account their current inven- 
tory status and their perceptions of future promotion activ- 
ity. Our key findings are as follows: 
*In a simulation that uses data generated by the structural model, 
the reduced-form odels consistently overpredicted switching 
elasticities and the percentage of the promotion sales bump due 
to brand switching. 
*The structural model fits the data better than the reduced-form 
models, including the reduced-form choice/incidence models. 
*In estimating these models on real data for the ketchup cate- 
gory, we observed the same pattern of estimated elasticities and 
switching percentages that we found in the simulation. 
*In evaluating the total effect on sales of a 50% increase in pro- 
motion frequency, the reduced-form odels predicted much 
higher sales gains than the dynamic structural model. 
The results suggest that, as we expected, reduced-form 
models overstate the brand-switching effects of promotion. 
All four analyses contribute to this conclusion. For example, 
the simulation convinces that the reduced-form models over- 
state elasticities on simulated data, but there is no guarantee 
that the simulated data, based on the structural model, reflect 
reality. The better fit of the dynamic structural model on real 
data, together with its sensible coefficient estimates and our 
observation of the same pattern in estimated elasticities in 
real data, suggests that the simulation reflects reality well 
and that the higher switching effects by the logit models in 
the empirical test are truly overstated. The policy analysis 
drives home the point that the real gain from the structural 
model is in evaluating major policy changes, because that is 
an area in which the model's explicit accounting for the cur- 
rent promotion policy works to advantage. 
As we expected, in all our analyses, the stand-alone logit 
model exhibits the most bias. Much, though not all, of the 
bias can be alleviated by estimating nested logit models 
with incidence; at least these models try to attain similar 
19Note that we assume that consumers learn the new schedule and update 
their frequency perceptions (it). The consumer may not be perfectly 
informed of the policy change. Because our article focuses more on how 
consumers adjust purchase given their perceptions on promotion schedule 
than on how they form promotion perceptions, we make this assumption 
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phenomena as the structural model by including variables 
such as PromTime as a means to model consumers' holding 
out for the next promotion. They can also account for loyal 
consumers' taking most advantage of promotions. These 
steps improve the elasticities and sales predictions but not as 
completely as does the dynamic structural model. 
We have also learned the following from the particular 
coefficients and results of our empirical study: 
*Consumers with intrinsically higher preference are more likely 
to take advantage of a promotion for their preferred brand. 
*Consumers appear to have accurate perceptions of promotion 
frequency in that our estimated parameters for promotion 
expectations corresponded well to actual promotion frequency. 
*Deceleration is a real phenomenon, as exhibited most directly 
by the significance of the PromTime variable. 
*A dynamic structural model of choice/incidence fits the data 
better and performs better on holdout data testing than do 
reduced-form odels that attempt to cover the same phenom- 
ena. This suggests that the effort of running consumers through 
a dynamic program pays off in better fit and prediction. 
Our findings have several important implications for 
researchers. First, the choice promotion-elasticity estimates 
derived from reduced-form models, especially stand-alone 
logit models, should be interpreted with caution. These elas- 
ticities are probably overstated. Second, researchers should 
devote more attention to dynamic structural models. We per- 
ceive movement in this direction (Erdem, Imai, and Keane 
2003; Erdem and Keane 1996; G6ntil and Srinivasan 1996; 
Sun 2000) and encourage research in this area. The cost of 
computation for these models is high, but with improved 
computing power they are becoming more practical. That 
the benefit of these models is relevant to managers (i.e., 
more accurate predictions of brand switching and sales lev- 
els) should spur the movement even more. Third, in the 
event that a researcher is unable to estimate a structural 
model, the next best model is an ad hoc choice/incidence 
model that includes variables such as PromTime. These 
variables are statistically important and help improve 
switching elasticity estimates. Fourth, our results encourage 
theoretical research that emphasizes purchase dynamics as a 
reason for promotion (see Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman 
1981). There is a need for additional economic models that 
examine the effects of dynamic rational consumer behavior 
on promotion policy in a competitive framework. 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSION, AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
First, promotions may be more of a purchase-timing game 
than a brand-switching game, as was previously believed. 
This is consistent with recent research that has shown the 
importance of stockpiling and deceleration (Bell, Chiang, 
and Padmanabhan 1999; Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999; 
Mela, Jedidi, and Bowman 1998; Seetharaman, Ainslie, and 
Chintagunta 1998; van Heerde, Gupta, and Wittink 2003; 
van Heerde, Leeflang, and Wittink 2000). 
Second, managers should be cautious of panel data-based 
simulations of forecasted changes in sales due to major pol- 
icy changes, if the forecasting models do not explicitly take 
into account how consumers will adjust to the new policy. 
Such forecasts may be overoptimistic because they do not 
consider how consumers will adjust to the policy change. 
For example, if reliance on promotion is doubled, many con- 
sumers who formerly bought at regular price will structure 
their buying habits to purchase during promotions. These 
are not truly incremental sales. 
Third, because loyal customers are more likely to pur- 
chase on promotion by adjusting purchase timing, manufac- 
turers should find ways to distinguish loyal customers from 
nonloyal customers and target the latter for promotion 
effort. 
Fourth, because consumer rational purchase strategies can 
have a negative impact on profit, manufacturers hould find 
ways to discourage consumers from taking advantage of 
promotion by adjusting purchase timing. For example, spec- 
ifying the maximum number of units purchased on promo- 
tion can increase the promotion effect of attracting new pur- 
chases switched from other brands or other stores but can 
limit stockpiling behavior. 
Although our results are quite encouraging, there are 
remaining issues that suggest topics for further research. 
First, it would be worthwhile to find reduced-form models 
that capture the incidence and choice process as well as the 
structural model. We believe this would be possible if the 
reduced-form models contained the correct variables; for 
example, promotion frequency could be incorporated 
directly in the model (see Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999). 
Second, as we mentioned previously, we can relax the 
assumption that consumption is constant. For some product 
categories, promotion also has a significant impact on con- 
sumption rate, which contributes to the incremental sales 
increase that promotion induces (for a structural model in 
which consumers endogenously decide how much to con- 
sume, see Sun 2003). Third, it would be beneficial to exam- 
ine profit. Promotion causes brand switching, which con- 
tributes positively to profit; however, promotion induces 
purchase acceleration or deceleration and stockpiling, which 
may contribute negatively to profit. What promotion strat- 
egy can balance these considerations in the presence of a 
consumer who will rationally adjust to any policy change? 
Fourth, as we also mentioned previously, regular price 
expectations and promotion depth as well as promotion fre- 
quency could be modeled. This would add complexity 
because of the additional continuous state space variable and 
is unlikely to change our basic result. However, the added 
insight of distinguishing between promotion and price 
would be important. Relatedly, rather than treat the promo- 
tion schedules as independent, further research could incor- 
porate dependencies. Fifth, it would be especially useful to 
model the process by which consumers learn promotion 
schedules. This would enhance the message from our Lucas 
critique simulation, which, for the sake of illustration, 
assumed that consumers readily learned the new promotion 
schedule. Finally, estimates of brand switching are at least 
indirectly related to the problem of estimating the "post- 
promotion dip" (e.g., Neslin and Stone 1996). The structural 
model we develop, embellished, for example, by incorporat- 
ing endogenous consumption, the number of units pur- 
chased, and transaction costs, would be useful for identify- 
ing the key factors that mask the postpromotion dip. 
Although we demonstrate the merit of the structural 
model, we must recognize some of the limitations of the 
approach. These models pose difficult estimation challenges 
that necessitate simplifying assumptions. More important, 
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developing and estimating such a model may be beyond the 
reach of most practitioners. Therefore, managers may con- 
tinue to rely on reduced-form models that are far simpler to 
estimate. By developing several reduced-form models for 
comparison purposes, we offer guidance for specifications 
that might alleviate, at least partially, the potential bias for 
overestimating the impact of promotion on brand switching. 
In conclusion, this research provides encouraging support 
that more accurate estimates of brand-switching elasticities 
can be obtained by incorporating forward-looking consumer 
behavior into structural models. This calls for further 
research projects in this area. As the buying public becomes 
more and more informed about prices and shopping issues, 
we believe that taking into account the rational consumer 
(Keane 1997b) will become more important in evaluating 
the effectiveness of sales promotions. 
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